An examination of the legal battle over Citizens United and its consequences for our electoral system.
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On a blazing summer afternoon in August of 2011, presidential candidate Mitt Romney's famously granite exterior showed a few cracks. The Republican frontrunner made the critical mistake of engaging with a heckler. At the insistence that we raise taxes on corporations, Romney recoiled: "Corporations are people, my friend!" The ensuing chorus of boos did not sound like it was coming from a friend.
While Governor Romney's quip proved unpopular, the opinion he espouses forms the crux of the majority rationale in the landmark Supreme Court case Citizens United v. Federal Election Committee. In this 5-4 decision, the United States' highest court overturned several key election law provisions, igniting a fiery public debate and opening the door to unlimited spending on political campaigns. The decision, handed down in January 2010, enshrines the principle of corporate personhood-the notion that corporations, just as individual citizens, hold a First Amendment right to free speech. This principle, coupled with Congress' refusal to regulate itself, has created a status quo that has the potential to harm the legitimacy of our political process. This can only be changed through legal action.
Mr. Romney's comment would have been a non sequitur in 2008 when Citizens United, a rightwing corporation, sought to advertise and distribute its film Hillary: The Movie. This "documentary" revolves around the life and times of Hillary Rodham Clinton, then one of the leading contenders for the Democratic nomination for president. The film paints an unflattering portrait of an egomaniacal woman, ruthless in her tactics, extreme in her beliefs, and unencumbered by common sense. The justices in the majority validated this claim by citing a line of United States Code, which defines the words "person" and "whoever" as they appear in legislation to include "corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals."
4 The legal concept of corporate personhood is nothing new: this definition of "person" is why corporations can own property, enter into contracts, sue, be sued, be subject to criminal and civil law, and so on. In the same way that you and I can enter into contracts and navigate our courts as individual citizens, so can John Q. Company.
Kennedy explicitly connects those definitions to the First Amendment by referring to Section One of the 14 th Amendment, which stipulates that no "person"
will be deprived "of the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
5 By applying the 14 th Amendment to corporations, the Justices make the statement that companies are "people" not just for the purposes of business interactions, but are also entitled to participate fully in our democracy as any individual citizen would.
However, this does not mean that corporations are exempt from any restriction. For example, the Tillman Act of 1907, which bans corporations from donating money directly to federal candidates above a certain amount, is still in force. Additionally, the ruling does not overturn the ban on uncapped donations to political parties. 6 These two restrictions have led to the rise of a uniquely American institution: the Super PAC. Due to the abandoned precedents in Citizens United, these special political action committees can be run by corporate entities, collect infinite sums of money from corporate donors, and spend the money supporting a chosen candidate and thrashing all the rest. Critically, Super PACs do not even need to disclose who donates to them, although Congress does have the power to compel them to do so. As Kennedy explains in the majority opinion, "The government may regulate corporate political speech through disclaimer and disclosure requirements, but it may not suppress that speech altogether." To summarize, corporations have the same rights as people, including speech, and as such they can raise money and finance as much political speech as they like. Money is therefore a form of free speech because it can buy speech. 10 In a move that surprised many supporters, the American Civil Liberties Union filed an amicus brief on behalf of Citizens United. In it, the ACLU argued that restrictions on "electioneering communications," laws that dictate when political messages can and cannot be aired, are "facially unconstitutional" and deserve to be struck down.
11 The sanctity of free speech, no matter what the cost, is the unassailable mantle for the majority opinion in this debate.
The more liberal Supreme Court justices reject their colleagues' interpretation of corporate personhood and its implications out of hand. In his dissenting opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens makes his disdain for corporate interference in federal campaigns known, "While American democracy is imperfect, few outside the majority of this court would have thought its flaws included a dearth of corporate money in politics."
12 His argument against the majority decision rests on two main beliefs: corporations are not entitled to First Amendment rights as "persons," and the ability of a corporation to radically outspend virtually any individual American will lead to a situation in which grass-roots speech is crowded out by corporate messaging. In other words, your ability to exercise First Amendment rights is so thoroughly outweighed by corporate power as to constitute an infringement on your rights. As the justice explains:
In the context of election to public office, the distinction between corporate and human speakers is significant. Although 14 This is not a surprising development. Despite rhetoric or intentions, all campaigns need money to function. Campaign funds pay for staff salaries, posters, buttons, office space, ad production, TV airtime, candidate travel, vans to drive supporters to the polls, and so on. If a candidate can successfully outspend his opponent, he can out-campaign him. This is crucial in the zero-sum game of two-party elections: a Democrat loss is a Republican gain, and vice versa. This armsrace mentality is why campaigns are getting inexorably more expensive. The projected cost of the presidential contest and all other races for federal posts is projected to shatter previous records, jumping from $5 billion in 2008 to as high as $7 billion by election day in 2012. By contrast, the 2000 federal election cost just $3 billion. Ultimately, the complexities of campaign finance in modern America present a true dilemma for our democracy. On the one hand, we could be relatively safe from outsized corporate influence in politics if we pass a constitutional amendment that allows Congress to limit campaign expenditures. However, this would make Congress the arbiter of who participates in our elections and to what extent. On the other hand, unrestrained corporate influence in campaigns makes back-room deals and influence peddling a nearguarantee, as many politicians will be willing to trade favors in exchange for corporate donations. This could be tempered, Justice Kennedy tells us, by laws that would require Super PACs to disclose who their donors are, thus revealing a candidate's potential biases to the electorate. House Democrats have repeatedly introduced the DISCLOSE Act, a bill that would force political action committees and electoral campaigns to release much of this information. However, the act seems doomed in the face of Republican opposition.
Either way, we are stuck with the worst of both worlds in the status quo. We do not have the protections against unaccountable Super PAC influence outlined in McCain-Feingold because the Supreme Court overturned them. Yet, we also do not have the systemic transparency to know which candidate is receiving help from which corporation. This presents a problem for our democracy: how can the voter be vigilant against influence-peddling lawmakers when he has no way of knowing which corporation or union is attempting to buy influence? Surely, you are more likely to vote against a candidate who is backed by a corporation you loathe, but in the status quo you have no way of knowing which corporation is spending for which candidate. Because we have not yet settled on an adequate solution to our campaign finance conundrum, this legal debate will rage on into future election cycles.
Author
THOMAS EDWARD CHIDIAC is a senior studying economics and politics and philosophy.
